When will a monopolist have incentives to leverage his market power in a primary market to foreclose competition in a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of his products with those of her rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents from the monopoly market by .restoring. second degree price discrimination. In a random coefficient model with complements we derive a policy test for when incentives to reduce rival quality will hold. Our application is to Microsoft's alleged strategic incentives to leverage market power from personal computer to server operating systems. We estimate a structural random coefficients demand system which allows for complements (PCs and servers). Our estimates suggest that there were incentives to reduce interoperability which were particularly strong at the turn of the 21st Century.
Introduction
Many antitrust cases revolve around compatibility issues (called "interoperability" in software markets). For example, the European Microsoft case focused on the question of whether Microsoft reduced interoperability between its personal computer (PC) operating system -Windows, a near monopoly product -and rival server operating systems (a complementary market) to drive rivals out of the workgroup server market. Microsoft's share of workgroup server operating systems rose substantially from 20% at the start of 1996 to near 60% in 2001 (see Figure   1 ) and the European Commission (2004) alleged that at least some of this increase was due to a strategy of making rival server operating systems work poorly with Windows. The possibility of such leveraging of market power from the PC to the server market was suggested by Bill
Gates in a 1997 internal e-mail: "What we're trying to do is to use our server control to do new protocols and lock out Sun and Oracle speci…cally....the symmetry that we have between the client operating system and the server operating system is a huge advantage for us". Microsoft eventually lost the case leading to the largest …nes in 50 years of EU anti-trust history. 1 Statements like those in Bill Gates' e-mail could just be management rhetoric. Indeed, the rationality of such foreclosure strategies has been strongly challenged in the past by the "Chicago School" critique of leverage theory (e.g. Bork, 1978) . For example, suppose one …rm has a monopoly for one product but competes with other …rms in a market for a second product, which is used by customers in …xed proportions with the …rst. The Chicago School observed that the monopolist in the …rst market did not have to monopolize the second market to extract monopoly rents. The monopolist will even bene…t from the presence of other …rms in this second market when there is product di¤erentiation. 2 Following the Chicago tradition, there has been much work on trying to derive e¢ ciency explanations for many practices that were previously seen as anti-competitive. 3 1 The initial interoperability complaint began in 1998 after beta versions of Windows 2000 were released. In 2004, the EU ordered Microsoft to pay e497 million for the abuse and supply interoperability information. In 2008, the EU …ned Microsoft an additional e899 million for failure to comply with the earlier decision. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Corp_v_Commission). 2 For a formal statement of this point, see Whinston (1990) , Proposition 3. 3 For example, Bowman (1957) , Adams and Yellen (1976) , Schmalensee (1984) , McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989).
More recently, studies of exclusive dealing (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) and tying 4 have shown that rational foreclosure in markets for complements is possible in several models. 5 Most of these models have the feature that exclusionary strategies are not necessarily pro…table in the short run. However, such strategies through their impact on investment, learning by doing, etc., can make current competitors less e¤ective in the future, making the exclusionary strategy pro…table in the long run. This paper makes several contributions. We propose a new theory of foreclosure through interoperability degradation and apply it to the market for PCs and servers. The theory suggests a relatively straightforward policy-relevant test for foreclosure incentives that can be used in many contexts. To implement the test we develop a structural econometric approach using detailed market level data (quarterly data from the US PC and server markets between 1996 and 2001), which requires extending a random coe¢ cient model to allow for complementary products. We …nd strong and robust incentives for Microsoft to degrade interoperability as the competition authorities alleged. 6 In our theory, the reduction of competition in the complementary (server) market allows the PC monopolist to more e¤ectively price discriminate between customers with heterogeneous demand. If customers with high elasticity of demand for PCs also have low willingness to pay for servers, server purchases can be used for second degree price discrimination. A monopolist both of PC and server operating systems would lower the price for the PC operating system and extract surplus from customers with inelastic PC demand by charging higher server operating system prices. Competition on the server market will limit the ability to price discriminate in this way. By reducing interoperability, the monopolist can reduce competition on the server market, re-establishing the ability to price discriminate.
Although the incentive can exist in theory, whether it is relevant in practice depends on the interplay between two e¤ects. The PC operating system monopolist bene…ts from reducing interoperability because he gains share in the server market. But because interoperability lowers 4 See Whinston (1990) , Farrell and Katz (2000) , Carlton and Waldman (2002) among others. 5 See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a comprehensive review of this literature and Whinston (2001) for an informal survey in relation to some aspects of the U.S. vs. Microsoft case. 6 Hence, our static motivation complements dynamic theories, for example those based on applications network e¤ects, that have been shown to generate anti-competitive incentives to extend monopoly (e.g. Carlton and Waldman, 2002) . These dynamic e¤ects would only make our static foreclosure incentives stronger. the quality of rival servers, some customers will purchase fewer PCs, and this reduces his pro…ts from the PC operating system monopoly. Our test quanti…es the magnitude of this di¤erence.
For the argument we are making, modelling the heterogeneity between buyers is essential for generating foreclosure incentives. Modelling customer heterogeneity in a ‡exible way is also a central feature of recent approaches for estimating demand systems in di¤erentiated product markets. We therefore …rst develop the theory on the basis of a discrete choice model with random coe¢ cients as used in demand estimations by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, henceforth BLP). We extend this approach to allowing complementarity between two markets and compare our results to those from existing approaches such as Gentzkow (2007) and Song and Chintagunta (2006) . We show theoretically and empirically how di¤erent assumptions on complementarity will a¤ect foreclosure incentives. For example, we show how overly strong restrictions on the assumed form of complementarity (e.g. not allowing a PC only purchase) can cause the econometrician to underestimate the scope for foreclosure.
One caveat to our approach is that although we can test whether there is a foreclosure incentive, our methodology cannot unequivocally resolve the question of whether foreclosure occurs and how much of the change in market shares was due to interoperability constraints. 7 The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 gives the basic idea and presents the core theoretical results relating to foreclosure. Section 3 details the econometrics, section 4 the data, section 5 the results and section 6 concludes. In the online Appendices we give more details of proofs (A), data (B), estimation techniques (C and E), derivations (D) and robustness (F).
Modelling Foreclosure Incentives
Our basic approach is to measure, at any point in time, the incentives for a monopolist in a primary market to reduce the quality of a rival in a complementary market through changes in the interoperability features of its monopoly product. In our application we examine whether 7 Demonstrating that foreclosure took place through interoperability degradation requires a more in-depth market investigation. In particular, we cannot separately identify whether the introduction of a new Microsoft operating system only enhanced the quality of Microsoft servers relative to others, or whether the decreases in interoperability also decreased the e¤ective quality of rival server operating systems. In the anti-trust case, the European Commission (2004) claimed that changes in Windows technology did seriously reduce interoperability. The evidence in this paper is consistent with the claim that Microsoft had an incentive to do this.
Microsoft had an incentive to degrade interoperability between its PC operating system and rival server operating systems in order to foreclose competition in the server operating system market. In this section we give an overview of how we identify this incentive.
2.1. The Test for Foreclosure Incentives. To outline our approach, we …rst introduce some notation that will be maintained for the rest of the paper. There are J di¤erent types of PCs o¤ered in the market. A buyer of PC j has to pay the pricep j for the hardware and ! for the operating system of the monopolist. 8 In the data, we observe the vector of PC prices p j =p j + ! 1 with element p j =p j + !. For servers we observe the corresponding vector of hardware/software total system prices p k =p k + ! k with element p k =p k + ! k , wherep k is the hardware price of server k and ! k is the price for the operating system running on that server. 9 We use the notation ! k = ! M when the server product k uses the PC monopolist's server operating system. We parameterize the degree of interoperability of the operating system of server k with the monopolist's PC operating system as a k 2 [0; 1]. We set a k = 1 for all servers that run the server operating system of the monopolist and a k = a 1 for servers with competing operating systems.
Given the price vectors we can de…ne demand functions for total demand for PCs, q(p j ; p k ; a), and the total demand for the monopolist's server operating system as q M (p j ; p k ; a). Total pro…ts of the monopolist are given by:
where c and c M are the corresponding marginal costs for the monopolist's PC and server operating system respectively. 10 We are interested in the incentive of the monopolist to decrease the interoperability para- 8 Over our sample period Apple, Linux and others had less than 5% of the PC market, so that Microsoft could be considered the monopoly supplier. We therefore do not use subscripts for PC operating system prices. We use "M" as the subscript when we refer to prices and quantities of sales of the monopolist's server operating system. 9 Note that we treat two servers with di¤erent operating system as di¤erent server products even if the hardware is identical.
1 0 The marginal cost can be thought of as being very close to zero in software markets.
meter a. By the envelope theorem, there will be such an incentive if:
The demand derivatives with respect to the interoperability parameter are total derivatives of the respective output measures holding the monopolist's operating system prices constant. This derivative contains the direct e¤ect of interoperability on demand as well as the impact of the price responses to a change in interoperability by all rival software and hardware producers.
Total demand for PCs will increase with greater interoperability because of complementarity between PCs and servers. Greater interoperability means that some customers start purchasing more PCs as the monopolist's rival servers have become more attractive. At the same time we expect the demand for the monopolist's server operating system, q M , to decrease when interoperability increases because some customers will switch to a rival server operating system. The relative impact on server and PC operating system demand from interoperability degradation will therefore be critical to the incentives to foreclose. Rearranging terms we obtain that there is an incentive to decrease interoperability at the margin if:
On the left hand side of equation (3) we have the "relative margin e¤ect". Interoperability degradation will only be pro…table if the margin on the server operating system of the monopolist (! M c M ) su¢ ciently exceeds the margin on the PC operating system (! c). We call the expression on the right hand side of (3) the "relative output e¤ect" as it measures the relative impact of a change in interoperability on demand for the PC operating system (the numerator increases with interoperability) and the monopolist's server operating system (the denominator decreases with interoperability) respectively.
Our estimation approach is designed to verify whether the strict inequality (3) holds in the data. Why is this a good test for foreclosure incentives when one might expect an optimal choice of interoperability by the monopolist to lead to a strict equality? First, it is costly to change operating systems to reduce the degree of interoperability and there are time lags between the design of the less interoperable software and its di¤usion on the market. Second, non-Microsoft server operating system vendors such as Novell and Linux sought to overcome the reduction in interoperability through a variety of measures such as developing "bridge"products, redesigning their own software, reverse engineering, etc. Third, there are many reasons why it will be impossible for a monopolist to reduce all interoperability to zero (i.e. making rival server operating systems non-functional). One reason is that there are di¤erent server market segments. For example, in European Commission (2004) it was claimed that Microsoft had an incentive to exclude rivals in workgroup server markets (the market which we focus on),
but not in the markets for web servers or enterprise servers. 11 The protocols that achieve interoperability for web servers may, however, provide some interoperability with workgroup servers thus preventing full interoperability degradation. This means the monopolist would want to reduce quality of the server rivals further if he could. Finally, since the late 1990s, anti-trust action in the US and EU may have slowed down Microsoft's desire to reduce interoperability.
All these reasons suggest that in the presence of foreclosure incentives we should …nd a strict incentive to foreclose at the margin, which is why we focus our analysis on estimating the relative margin and output e¤ects.
Measuring the Relative Margin E¤ect.
The margins on PC and server operating systems are very hard to observe directly. For our econometric estimations we only have prices of PCs and servers bought inclusive of an operating system. While there do exist some list prices of operating systems that allow us to infer an order of magnitude, we have to estimate the operating system margins from the data. For this estimation we therefore have to impose a speci…c model of price setting. Given the complementarity between software and hardware as well as between PCs and servers, the move order in price setting is important for determining the pricing incentives for the monopolist. We assume that the hardware and software companies set their prices simultaneously so that the price the software company charges is directly added to whatever price the hardware company charges for the computer. This assumption seems consistent with what we observe in the market as Microsoft e¤ectively controlled the price of the software paid by end users through licensing arrangements. 12 Maximizing equation (1) with respect to the PC operating system price ! and the monopolist's server operating system price ! M yields the …rst order conditions:
Denoting @q @! 1 q = " ! as the semi-elasticity of the impact of a change in operating system price (!) on quantity demanded (q), we can solve equations (4) and (5) for the PC monopolist's pro…t margins:
PC monopolist' s operating system margin:
PC monopolist' s server operating system margin:
There are four relevant semi-elasticities: the own-price elasticity of the operating systems of PCs (" ! ), the own-price elasticity of the monopolist's server operating system (" M ! M ), the cross price elasticity of the monopolist's servers with respect to PC operating system prices (" M ! )
and the cross price elasticity of PCs with respect to the monopolist's server operating system prices (" ! M ). The semi-elasticities that determine the right hand side of these two equations can be estimated from PC and server sales and price data. The operating systems margins and the relative margin e¤ect can therefore be inferred from estimating the parameters of an appropriate demand system.
A …rst remark on equations (6) and (7) is that the price cost margins di¤er from the standard single product monopoly margins due to the ratios of cross-to own-price elasticities of PC and server operating system demands,
. In general, mark-ups will be a¤ected both by the degree of competition and by the degree of complementarity. As a benchmark case, suppose that PCs and servers are perfect complements which means that customers buy servers and PCs in …xed proportions (i.e. exactly w PCs for every server purchased). With competition between di¤erent server operating systems we should generally expect
: the demand response of the monopolist's server operating system should be greater for an increase in the server operating system price (! M ) than the PC operating system price (!), because the latter leads to a price increase for all servers and therefore does not lead to substitution between servers due to relative price changes. In the limit, as the server operating system market becomes perfectly competitive, i.e. we would expect
to decrease as competition in the market for server operating systems increases. A further implication of this discussion is that a naive estimation of PC operating system margins that ignored the complementarity between PCs and servers (as the literature typically does) will systematically generate incorrect results for estimated margins. Generally, we would expect operating system margins to be over-stated by the failure to recognize this complementarity. This could be why estimates of PC operating system margins on the basis of elasticities appear to be much higher than their actual empirical values (e.g. quality reduction of all rivals on demand can be deduced directly from the demand estimates, the total output e¤ect needs to take into account the pricing reactions of rival server operating system and hardware producers. To measure this indirect e¤ect of a quality change on relative output we impose the assumption of pro…t maximizing behavior also for all rival software and hardware companies. A server with lower quality will command lower prices in equilibrium.
Furthermore, if PC demand is reduced as a result of lower server qualities, PC hardware sellers will also partly accommodate by reducing their prices in order to increase demand. These equilibrium price adjustments are crucial to measure the size of the relative output e¤ect. We therefore compute the equilibrium pricing response of each hardware and software producer to a common change of quality in non-Microsoft servers given the estimated demand function assuming a Nash equilibrium in prices. These price responses can then be used to compute the relevant demand derivatives to determine the relative output e¤ect (see Appendix D for details).
To check the robustness of our results we also estimate reduced form equations for PC server operating systems that depend only on quality indices and the estimated price cost margins of the monopolist. The derivatives of this reduced form demand with respect to the quality indices can then be used directly to calculate the relative output e¤ect. This approach avoids the strong structural assumptions we have to make in the …rst approach, but has more ambiguities of interpretation. We show that the qualitative conclusions of the two approaches are essentially the same (see Appendix F for details).
Implications of customer heterogeneity for incentives to degrade interoper-
abilty. In this sub-section we show how di¤erent types of heterogeneity map into foreclosure incentives. The mechanisms that generate foreclosure incentives are all based on theories in which competition in the server market interferes with a (privately) optimal price discrimination strategy by the PC monopolist. By foreclosing the server market, the monopolist can increase rent extraction by using the price of the PC and server operating systems to target di¤erent types of customers.
The sign of the relative margin e¤ect is determined by the sign of the server margin in equation (7), which in turn depends only on:
where "the aggregate elasticity of demand"(i.e. across all consumers) is
and P ( ) and (w) are the population distribution functions of and w. 13 It follows that the server operating system margin will be positive if the own price semi-elasticity of the PC oper- 1 3 The derivation of (8) . This means that on average buyers with relatively more elastic PC demand (a more negative " ! than " ! ) have higher market shares in PC purchases than in server purchases from the monopolist. It follows that the server margin will be zero if there is no heterogeneity -the monopolist does best by setting the price of the server at marginal cost and extracting all surplus through the PC operating system price.
In this case there is no incentive to foreclose rival servers because all rent can be extracted through the PC price:
If there is no demand heterogeneity in the parameter vector ( ; w), then the "one monopoly pro…t" theory holds. The PC operating system monopolist sells the server operating system at marginal cost and extracts all rents with the PC price. The monopolist has no incentive to degrade interoperability.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
In order to generate foreclosure incentives the optimal extraction of surplus for the monopolist involves making a margin on the server product. In that case, competition among server operating systems reduces the margin that can be earned on servers and thus restricts the ability of the PC monopolist to extract monopoly rents. By limiting interoperability, rival server quality is reduced and the monopolist "restores" a server margin.
Foreclosure incentives require sorting customers with inelastic PC demand into buying the monopolist's server operating system, and customers with more elastic PC demand into not buying the server. Our central model generates this feature by assuming customers do not necessarily need to buy a server in order to gain value from PCs. By contrast, servers are complements to PCs in the sense that they only have value when they are consumed with PCs.
We call this the imperfect complementarity case. 14 To see this, consider a limited type of heterogeneity where buyers have di¤erent marginal valuations of server quality i , which can be either or 0. Server quality is denoted y k . We also assume that there is no other heterogeneity across consumers with respect to the server product and without loss of generality assume only one brand of PC and one brand of server with the monopolist's server operating system. Given this we can prove: Proposition 2. Suppose that i 2 f0; g. Then the monopolist sets the server operating system price strictly above marginal cost. Then there exists y k > y M , such that for all y k 2 (y M ; y k ) it is optimal for the monopolist to foreclose a competitor by fully degrading the quality of a competing server operating system.
Proposition 2 states that when the monopolist has a server margin, for some values of rival server quality above the monopolist's server quality ( y k > y M ), the monopolist will degrade rival quality. The positive value of the server margin follows from equation (8) . Although all groups have positive PC sales, the server market share of customers with high value for the server ( i = ) is 1 whereas that of customers with low value ( i = 0) is zero. This means that there is a positive correlation between the elasticity of demand of the type and the relative importance of that type in PC sales.
Now consider competition on the server operating system market. By standard Bertrand arguments, competition between the two server products will compete down the price of the lower quality product to no more than marginal cost, and the higher quality …rm can extract (at most) the additional value provided by its higher quality. If the rival server does not have too much higher quality it will extract all of the quality improvement over the monopolist's product in the server price. This means that a PC monopolist with the lower quality server will generate the same pro…t as setting the server price at marginal cost without competition and setting the conditionally optimal PC price. Fully foreclosing the competitor is therefore optimal even if the competitor has arbitrarily better quality than the monopolist. Note also that for a rival …rm with lower server quality the monopolist cannot extract the full value of its own server quality but only the improvement over the quality of the rival. Hence, reducing the quality of the rival slightly will increase the ability to extract surplus.
Proposition 2 holds because competition limits the ability of the PC operating system monopolist to optimally extract surplus. If customers with high elasticity of PC demand sort away from servers, then server sales can be used as a second degree price discrimination device, allow-ing the monopolist to extract more surplus from high server value/low elasticity customers. 15 
Econometric Strategy
3.1. The Model of Demand. The previous section showed the key theoretical mechanisms at play. We now turn to how we econometrically model the problem by considering individual demand as a discrete choice of "workgroup" purchases. A buyer i of type w has demand for a PC workgroup which consists of w PCs and one server. We assume that each buyer can connect his workgroup to at most one server. 16 As before, there are J producers of PCs and K producers of servers indexed by j and k respectively. 17 The index j = 0 refers to a purchase that does not include PCs while k = 0 refers to an option that does not include a server. A buyer i with workgroup size w who buys the PCs from producer j and the server from producer k has conditional indirect utility:
The total price for the workgroup is given by w i p j + p k 18 and the income sensitivity of utility of buyer i is measured by i . The characteristics of PC j are captured by the vector x j and the 1 5 Note that even where this foreclosure e¤ect exists, it is not always the case that there are marginal incentives to foreclose. For example in the above model there are no marginal incentives to foreclose when the rival has higher quality. A small reduction in the quality has no e¤ect on the pro…ts of the monopolist in that case. Only a reduction below the quality of the incumbent will increase pro…ts. In more general models there can even be a negative marginal incentive to foreclose when there are global incentives to foreclose. This arises from a vertical product di¤erentiation e¤ect. Locally a small increase in the quality of a higher quality rival can lead to higher pro…ts for the monopolist by relaxing price competition as in a Shaked and Sutton (1992) style product di¤erentiation model. Nevertheless, there may be incentives to dramatically reduce quality of the rival in order to increase pro…ts even further. Our focus in the empirical analysis of the marginal incentives to foreclose may therefore lead to an underestimation of the true foreclosure incentives. 1 6 Assuming that the purchase decisions are only about the setup of a whole "workgroup" implies some important abstractions from reality. If server systems are used for serving one workgroup we e¤ectively assume that the whole system is scalable by the factor 1=w. E¤ectively, we are capturing all potential e¤ects of pre-existing stocks of servers and PCs (together with their operating systems) by the distribution of ijk in equation (8) . Since we are assuming that this distribution is invariant over time, we are implicitly assuming that (modulo some time trend) the distribution of stocks of computers is essentially invariant. Also note that scalability of workgroups implies that we are not allowing for any di¤erence in …rm size directly. All such di¤erences will be incorporated into the distribution of the ijk and the parameters ( i ; i ; i) including a (heterogenous) constant. The idea is to make the relationship between size and purchases as little dependent on functional form as possible. 1 7 For notationally simplicity we are associating one producer with one PC or server hardware type. In the empirical work we, of course, allow for multi-product …rms. 1 8 We can allow for two part tari¤s by having p k take the form p k (w) = p k1 + wp k2 . This can allow for typical pricing structures in which there is a …xed price for the server operating system and a pricing component based on the number of users (i.e. w "Client Access Licences" have to be purchased). We can accommodate such pricing without any problems in our approach. All that is really important for the pricing structure is that there is some …xed component to the pricing of the monopolist's server operating system. For simplicity we will exposit all of the analysis below ignoring licenses based on client user numbers. characteristics of server hardware software k are represented by the vector y k . The vectors i and i represent the marginal value of these characteristics to buyer i. We normalize quality by assuming that the interoperability parameter a = 1 whenever server producer k has the Windows operating system installed. We assume that a k = a 1 is the same for all non-Microsoft servers.
In the case of j = 0, (x j ; p j ) is the null vector, while in the case of k = 0, (y k ; p k ) is the null vector. These represent "workgroup" purchase without a server or without PCs respectively.
The models we estimate di¤er in whether these choices are allowed, which captures di¤erent assumptions about the degree of complementarity. The terms j and k represent unobserved quality characteristics of the PC and server respectively, while jk represents an interaction e¤ect between a speci…c PC and server type.
The term ijk represents a buyer speci…c shock to utility for the particular workgroup selected. Assumptions on the distribution of this term among customers will model the degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation between di¤erent workgroup o¤erings. Given that we make ijk workgroup speci…c, the variables jk and ijk capture all of the potential complementarities between the PCs and the servers in a workgroup. In the empirical section we generally assume that jk = 0 except for one model version in which jk is a common shift variable for utility whenever a buyer consumes PCs and servers together.
Following BLP, we allow random coe¢ cients on the parameter vector i = ( i ; i ; i ) as well as heterogeneity in the size of work groups w i (captured by a random coe¢ cient on the server price, S i i =w i ). 19 We derive demand from the above utility function in the standard way (see Appendix A), the key assumptions being that ijk comes from a double exponential distribution and that ( i ; w i ) are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. 20 We can then calculate market shares, s ij for buyer i of PC j as:
and for servers as:
where the mean utilities are:
and the "individual e¤ects" are:
The ( P C i ; P C ip ; S i ; S ip ) is a vector of the normalized individual e¤ects on the parameters and
is the vector of standard deviations of these e¤ects in the population. Notice that the individual e¤ects, ij and ik , depend on the interaction of customer speci…c preferences and product characteristics. 21 3.2. Baseline Imperfect Complementarity Model. Our baseline imperfect complementarity demand model can be empirically implemented in the standard fashion of BLP demand models. We allow customers to select either w PCs or a "workgroup"of w PCs and one server.
The indirect utility of the outside option is u i00 = P C 0
the price of the outside good is normalized to zero. Since relative levels of utility cannot be identi…ed, the mean utility of one good has to be normalized to zero so we set 0 = 0. The terms in i0 accounts for the outside alternatives'unobserved variance.
To connect the empirical framework with the theoretical model, we model the interoperability parameter (a) as a multiplicative e¤ect that customers derive from having a Microsoft (M ) server:
2 1 Hence, our modelling approach is to …x the random draws on the heterogeneity of consumers' preferences and to compare the results of di¤erent assumptions on the strength of the complementarity between servers and PCs (imperfect complementarity vs. free complementarity). An alternative approach would have been to allow consumers to have some correlation in their preferences across PCs and servers as well as an idiosyncratic draw that could directly be estimated from the data. The aggregate nature of our data did not allow us to estimate such more ‡exible models.
where M is a dummy variable equal to one if the server runs a Microsoft operating system and zero otherwise. In this way, the interoperability parameter is captured by a combination of the estimated coe¢ cients and therefore we can calculate the "relative output e¤ect" in one step (see Appendix D for details). Given this parameterization, the relationship between the mean utility for servers in equation (12) and the estimates is that 3 = (1 a) and 1 = a , where 0 a 1 is the interoperability parameter. 22 If there were no interoperability limitations between Microsoft and non-Microsoft operating systems (a = 1), then 3 , the coe¢ cient on the interaction variable in equation (13), would be estimated as zero.
3.3. Estimation. Our estimation strategy closely follows the spirit of the BLP estimation algorithm, but modi…es it so that "multiple product categories" (i.e. PCs and servers) can be accommodated. In essence, the algorithm minimizes a nonlinear GMM function that is the product of instrumental variables and a structural error term. This error term, de…ned as the unobserved product characteristics, = (
, is obtained through the inversion of the market share equations after aggregating appropriately the individual customer's preferences.
However, the presence of multiple product categories means that we need to compute the unobserved term, , via a category-by-category contraction mapping procedure (for a detailed description of the algorithm followed see Appendix C).
Implementing the contraction mapping for PCs and servers is consistent with BLP, but a concern is that feedback loops between the two categories could alter the parameter estimates.
There is no theoretical proof we know of for a contraction mapping for random coe¢ cient models with complements, but we made two empirical checks on the results involving further iterations of the algorithm across the two product categories. These both lead to very similar results to the ones presented here (see discussion in Appendix C).
The weighting matrix in the GMM function was computed using a two-step procedure. To minimize the GMM function we used both the Nelder-Mead nonderivative search method and the faster Quasi-Newton gradient method based on an analytic gradient. 23 We combine all these 2 2 We allow 2 to be freely estimated as it could re ‡ect the higher (or lower) quality of Windows compared to other operating systems. Alternatively, 2 could also re ‡ect interoperability limitations. We examine this possibility in a robustness exercise. 2 3 In all contraction mappings, we de…ned a strict tolerance level: for the …rst hundred iterations the tolerance level is set to 10E-8, while after every 50 iterations the tolerance level increases by an order of ten. methods to verify that we reached a global instead of a local minimum.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are calculated taking into consideration the additional variance introduced by the simulation. 24 In our benchmark speci…cation we draw a sample of 150 customers, but we also experiment with more draws in our robustness section.
Con…dence intervals for nonlinear functions of the parameters (e.g., relative output and relative margin e¤ects) were computed by using a parametric bootstrap. We drew repeatedly (2,000 draws) from the estimated joint distribution of parameters. For each draw we computed the desired quantity, thus generating a bootstrap distribution.
Identi…cation and instrumental variables.
Identi…cation of the population moment condition is based on an assumption and a vector of instrumental variables. Following BLP we assume that the unobserved product level errors are uncorrelated with the observed product characteristics. In other words, that the location of products in the characteristics space is exogenous. In our view, this is realistic for both the PC and server manufacturers since most R&D and components built are developed and produced by other …rms, not the PC or server manufacturers themselves. Given this exogeneity assumption, characteristics of other products will be correlated with price, since the markup for each model will depend on the distance from its nearest competitors. To be precise, for both PCs and servers we use the number of products produced by the …rm and the number produced by its rivals, as well as the sum of various characteristics (PCs: speed, RAM, hard drive; servers: RAM, whether the server is rack optimized, number of racks, number of models running Unix) of own and rival models.
One of the many contributions of Gandhi and Houde (2015) is the insight that the power of the instruments can be signi…cantly improved by choosing a sub-set of "close" characteristics of rival products. Following this idea, we also constructed all instruments in the PC equation separately for desktops and laptops. 25 As emphasized by the important contribution of Berry and Haile (2014), we also examine the robustness of our results by varying the type of instruments used. First, we experimented 2 4 We do not correct for correlation in the disturbance term of a given model across time because it turns out to be very small.Two features of our approach appear to account for this …nding: First, …rm …xed e¤ects are included in the estimation. Second, there is a high turnover of products, with each brand model observation having a very short lifecycle compared to other durables like autos. 2 5 See also Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg's (1997) study of the PC market.
using alternative combinations of computer characteristics. Second, we use hedonic price series of computer inputs, such as semi-conductor chips, which are classic cost shifters. The results are robust to these two alternative sets of instruments, but they were less powerful in the …rst stage. Finally, we followed Hausman (1996) and Hausman et al (1994) and used model-level prices in other countries (such as Canada, Europe or Japan) as alternative instruments. These instruments were powerful in the …rst stage, but there was evidence from the diagnostic tests that they were invalid (see Genakos, 2004 and Van Reenen, 2004 , for more discussion).
Finally, one important limitation of using aggregate data is that we cannot separate true complementarity (or substitutability) of goods from correlation in customers'preferences (see Gentzkow, 2007) . Observing that …rms that buy PCs also buy servers might be evidence that the two product categories in question are complementary. It might also re ‡ect the fact that unobservable tastes for the goods are correlated -that some …rms just have a greater need for "computing power". However, notice that for our purposes such a distinction does not make a major di¤erence to the theoretical results -so long as there is a correlation between customers' heterogeneous preferences for PCs and their probability of buying servers, the incentive to foreclose can exist.
Data
Quarterly data on quantities and prices between 1996Q1 and 2001Q1 was taken from the PC Quarterly Tracker and the Server Quarterly Tracker, two industry censuses conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC). The Trackers gather information from the major hardware vendors, component manufacturers and various channel distributors and contains information on model-level revenues and transaction prices. 26 The information on computer characteristics is somewhat limited in IDC, so we matched more detailed PC and server characteristics from several industry datasources and trade magazines. We concentrate on the top fourteen computer hardware producers with sales to large businesses (over 500 employees) in the US market to match each observation with more detailed product characteristics. 27 We focus on 2 7 These manufacturers (in alphabetical order) are: Acer, Compaq, Dell, Digital, Fujitsu, Gateway, HewlettPackard, IBM, NEC, Packard Bell, Sony, Sun, Tandem and Toshiba. Apple was excluded due to the fact that we were unable to match more detail characteristics in the way its processors were recorded by IDC. large businesses as these are the main customers who clearly face a choice to use servers (see Genakos, 2004 , for an analysis of other consumer segments).
For PCs the unit of observation is distinguished into form factor (desktop vs. laptop), vendor (e.g. Dell), model (e.g. Optiplex), processor type (e.g. Pentium II) and processor speed (e.g. 266 MHZ) speci…c. In terms of characteristics we also know RAM (memory), monitor size and whether there was a CD-ROM or Ethernet card included. A key PC characteristic is the performance "benchmark"which is a score assigned to each processor-speed combination based on technical and performance characteristics.
Similarly, for servers a unit of observation is de…ned as a manufacturer and family/modeltype. We also distinguish by operating system, since (unlike PCs) many servers run nonWindows operating systems (we distinguish six other categories: Netware, Unix, Linux, VMS, OS390/400 and a residual category). For servers key characteristics are also RAM, the number of rack slots, 28 whether the server was rack optimized (racks were an innovation that enhanced server ‡exibility), motherboard type (e.g. Symmetric Parallel Processing -SMP), and chip type (CISC, RISC or IA32). Appendix B contains more details on the construction of our datasets.
Potential market size is tied down by assuming that …rms will not buy more than one new PC for every worker per year. The total number of employees in large businesses is taken from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics. Results based on di¤erent assumptions about the potential market size are also reported. Table A1 provides sales weighted means of the basic variables for PCs that are used in the speci…cations below. These variables include quantity (in actual units), price (in $1,000), benchmark (in units of 1,000), memory (in units of 100MB) as well as identi…ers for desktop, CD-ROM and Ethernet card. Similarly, Table A2 provides sales weighted means of the basic variables that are used for servers. These variables include quantity (in actual units), price (in $1,000), memory (in units of 100MB), as well as identi…ers for rack optimized, motherboard type, each operating system used and number of racks. The choice of variables was guided by technological innovation taking place during the late 1990s, but also developments and trends in related markets (e.g. Ethernet for internet use or CD-ROM for multimedia). Furthermore, technological progress is accompanied by rapidly falling prices. The sales-weighted average price of PCs fell by 40% over our sample period (from $2,550 to under $1,500). 29 Similar trends hold for the server market. Core characteristics, such as RAM, exhibit an average quarterly growth of 12% over the sample period, the proportion of servers using rackoptimization rose from practically zero at the start of the period to 40% by the end. The average price of servers fell by half during the same period (from $13,523 to $6,471). More importantly, for our purposes, is the dramatic rise of Windows on the server from 20% at the start of the sample to 57% by the end. As also seen in Figure 1 , this increase in Windows' market share comes mainly from the decline of Novell's Netware (down from 38% at the start of the sample to 14% by the end) and, to a lesser extent of the various ‡avors of Unix (down from 24% to 18%). The only other operating system to have grown is open source Linux, although at the end of the period it had under 10% of the market. 30 
Results

Main Results.
We …rst turn to the demand estimates from a simple logit model (Table   1 for PCs and Table 2 for servers) and the full random coe¢ cients model (Table 3) , before discussing their implications in terms of the theoretical model. The simple logit model (i.e. ij = ik = 0) is used to examine the importance of instrumenting the price and to test the di¤erent sets of instrumental variables discussed in the previous section for each product category separately. Table 1 reports the results for PCs obtained from regressing ln(s jt ) ln(s 0t ) on prices, brand characteristics and manufacturer identi…ers. The …rst two columns include a 2 9 There is an extensive empirical literature using hedonic regressions that documents the dramatic declines in the quality adjusted price of personal computers. See, for example, Berndt and Rappaport (2001) and Pakes (2003) .
3 0 Even Linux's limited success, despite being o¤ered at a zero price, is mainly con…ned to server functions at the "edge" of the workgroup such as web-serving rather than the core workgroup task of …le and print and directory services (see European Commission, 2004, for more discussion). Web servers have been considered outside the relevant market in the European Commission decision. full set of time …xed e¤ects, whereas the last four columns include only a time trend (a restriction that is not statistically rejected). Column (1) reports OLS results: the coe¢ cient on price is negative and signi…cant as expected, but rather small in magnitude. Many coe¢ cients have their expected signs -more recent generations of chips are highly valued as is an Ethernet card or CD-ROM drive. But a key performance metric, RAM, has a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient, although the other quality measure, performance "benchmark", has the expected positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient. Furthermore, the …nal row of Table 1 shows that the vast majority of products (85.5%) are predicted to have inelastic demands, which is clearly unsatisfactory.
Column (2) of Table 1 Table A3 ) indicate that the instruments have power: the F-statistic of the joint signi…cance of the excluded instruments is 9 in column (2) and 27 in column (4). In the last two columns we restrict the number of instruments dropping hard disks in column (3) and also speed in column (4). Focusing on a sub-set of the more powerful instruments further improves our results. In the last column, for example, the …rst stage F-test is 41, moving the price coe¢ cient further away from zero, leaving no PC with inelastic demand. Table 2 reports similar results from the simple logit model for the server data. In columns (1) and (2) the OLS and IV results are again reported based on regressions that include a full set of time …xed e¤ects, whereas the latter four columns include instead a time trend (a statistically acceptable restriction). The price terms are signi…cant, but with a much lower point estimate than PCs. Consistent with the PC results, the coe¢ cient on server price falls substantially moving from OLS to IV (e.g. from -0.040 in column (3) to -0.179 in column (4)).
Columns (4)- (6) of Table 2 experiment with di¤erent instrument sets (…rst stages are reported in full in Table A4 ). Empirically, the most powerful set of instruments were the number of models by the …rm, the number of models produced by rivals …rms and the sum of RAM by rivals (used in columns (2) and (6)). We use these instruments in all columns and also include the o¢ cial series for quality-adjusted prices for semi-conductors and for hard-disks (two key inputs for servers) in columns (4) and (5). In addition, column (5) includes sums of rivals'characteristics (rack-optimized servers, numbers of racks and use of Unix). Although the parameter estimates are reasonably stable across the experiments, the F-test of excluded instruments indicates that the parsimonious IV set of column (6) is preferred, with a F-statistic of 12.9. In these preferred estimates we …nd that RAM, the number of racks (an indicator of scalability) and type of chip appear to be signi…cantly highly valued by customers. Most importantly, the estimated proportion of inelastic model demands in the …nal row falls from over 80% in column (3) to 22% in column (6) . Notice also that the coe¢ cient on the interaction of Windows and RAM is always positive and signi…cant in the IV results which is consistent with the idea of some interoperability constraints. 32 A sense-check on the results is to use the fact that the implied workgroup size (the number of PCs per server) can be estimated from the ratio of the price coe¢ cients in the PC equation to those in the server equations. In the IV speci…cations, the implied workgroup size ranges from 10.6 in column (9) to 18.9 in column (2) which are plausible sizes of workgroups (e.g. European Commission, 2004; International Data Corporation, 1998). Our estimates of PC hardware brand-level elasticities are within the typical range of those estimated in the literature, but are relatively inelastic probably because we focus on large …rms rather than on households. 33 One diagnostic problem is that the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identi…cation restrictions reject throughout Tables 1 and 2 , a common problem in this literature. There is some improvement as we move to the preferred more parsimonious speci…cations, but it is a concern for the instruments.
Results from the baseline random coe¢ cients model are reported in column (1) of Table 3 .
The …rst two panels (A and B) report the mean coe¢ cients for PCs and servers respectively. Almost all mean coe¢ cients are signi…cant and have the expected sign. The lower rows (C and D) report the results for the random coe¢ cients. We allow random coe¢ cients only on price and one other basic characteristic in our baseline speci…cation -performance benchmark for PCs and RAM for servers. 34 Our results indicate that there is signi…cant heterogeneity in the price coe¢ cient for PCs and servers. For PCs, the random coe¢ cient for the performance benchmark has a large value and although insigni…cant in column (1) is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the other columns (see below). The robust …nding of heterogeneity in the PC price coe¢ cient is important for our theory as this drives the desire to price discriminate which, according to the model, underlies the incentive to foreclose the server market.
As a cross-check on the plausibility of the estimates it is important that the implied hardware margins from the baseline model seem realistic for both PCs and servers. Assuming multiproduct …rms and Nash-Bertrand competition in prices for PC and server hardware …rms, our derived median margin is 16% for PCs and 34% for servers. This is in line with industry reports at the time that put the gross pro…t margins of the main PC manufacturers in the range of 10%-20% and for server vendors in the range of 25%-54%. 35 Furthermore, the implied mean workgroup size of 10.2 (the ratio of the mean coe¢ cients on PC vs. server prices) is also reasonable. Stavins (1997) . 3 4 We also estimated models allowing a random coe¢ cient on the interaction of RAM with Microsoft. This was insigni…cant and the implied overall e¤ects were similar so we keep to the simpler formulation here. 3 5 See International Data Corporation (1999a,b). The numbers are also consistent with other results in the literature. For example, Goeree (2008) , using a di¤erent quarterly US data set for 1996-1998, reports a median margin of 19% for PCs from her preferred model, whereas ours is 16%. Figure 2 plots the calculated relative output and operating system margin e¤ects based on these coe¢ cients (together with the 90% con…dence interval). 36 Server operating system margins are higher than PC operating system margins (as indicated by relative margins well in excess of unity). Note that the operating system margin di¤erences are similar to some crude industry estimates. 37 The higher margin on servers than PC operating systems re ‡ects both greater customer sensitivity to PC prices, but more interestingly the …nding that there is signi…cant heterogeneity in the e¤ects of price on demand across customers. According to proposition 2 this heterogeneity creates incentives for the PC monopolist to use the server market as a price discrimination device by charging a positive server margin. The positive value of the relative output e¤ect indicates that reducing interoperability has a cost to Microsoft which is the loss of PC demand (due to complementarity). The shaded area in Figure 2 indicates where we estimate that Microsoft has signi…cant incentives to degrade interoperability. 3 6 Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the calculated relative output and margin e¤ects together with the 95% con…dence interval. 3 7 Large businesses will enjoy more discounts than individuals, so we cannot simply look at list prices. IDC (1999, Table 1 ) estimate server operating environment revenues for Windows as $1,390m million and license shipments for Windows NT were as 1,814 (Table 4 ). This implies a "transaction price" for a Windows server operating system (including CALs) as $766. Similar caluclations for PC operating systems are around $40, suggesting a relative margin 19 to 1 similar to Figure 1 . PC operating system sales. As we will show later these four …ndings are robust to alternative empirical models of complementarity and a battery of robustness tests.
The increase in the relative server-PC margin is mainly driven by the increase in the absolute value of the PC own price elasticity. This is likely to be caused by the increasing "commodi…ca-tion"of PCs over this time period linked to the increasing entry of large numbers of PC brands by low cost manufacturers (e.g. Dell and Acer) as the industry matured and cheaper production sites in Asia became available. The relative output e¤ect is declining primarily because the aggregate number of servers sold was rising faster than the number of PCs, which is related to the move away from mainframes to client-server computing (see Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999 ). Thus, a marginal change in interoperabilty had a smaller e¤ect on loss of PC quantity (relative to the gain in servers) in 2001 than in 1996. Table 3 report various robustness tests of the baseline model (reproduced in Figure 3A to ease comparisons) to gauge the sensitivity of the results to changes in our assumptions. We show that the basic qualitative result that there were incentives to degrade interoperability is robust. First, we vary the number of random draws following the Monte Carlo evidence from Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004) for the BLP model. In column (2) we increase the number of draws to 500 (from 150 in the baseline model). The estimated results are very similar to our baseline speci…cation, the only exception being that the PC benchmark now has a signi…cant random coe¢ cient. Unsurprisingly, the calculated relative output and margin e¤ects in Figure 3B exhibit the same pattern as in Figure 3A .
Robustness. Columns (2)-(8) of
In column (3) and (4) of Table 3 we make di¤erent assumptions about the potential market size. In column (3) we assume that …rms will only make a purchase decision to give all employees a computer every two years, essentially reducing the potential market size by half. In column (4) we assume that the potential market size is asymmetric, whereby …rms purchase a PC every year whereas they purchase a server bundle every two years. In both experiments the estimated coe¢ cients are hardly changed and Figures 3C and 3D are similar.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 we reduce the number of instruments used for both the PCs and servers. On the one hand, using the most powerful instruments increases the absolute value of the coe¢ cients. For example, the mean coe¢ cient on PC price increases from -3.301 in the baseline model to -3.622 and -5.598 in columns (5) and (6) respectively. On the other hand, using fewer instruments means that we are reducing the number of identifying restrictions and this is re ‡ected in higher standard errors. As a result very few coe¢ cients are signi…cant in column (6) . Despite these di¤erences, Figures 3E and 3F reveal a qualitative similar picture as before.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 we experiment using di¤erent random coe¢ cients. In column (7), we add a random coe¢ cient on the constant in both equations. The estimated coe¢ cients indicate no signi…cant heterogeneity for the outside good at the 5% level for either PCs or servers. In column (8) we reduce the number of estimated random coe¢ cients by allowing only a random coe¢ cient on server price. As before, both the estimated coe¢ cients and calculated e¤ects in Figures 3G and 3H look similar to our baseline speci…cation: at the beginning of our sample the relative output e¤ect dominates the relative margin e¤ect, but by the end of 2000 the ordering is clearly reversed indicating strong incentives from Microsoft's perspective to reduce interoperability.
5.
3. Free complementarity model. Our baseline model is more restrictive in that complementarity between PCs and servers is built in rather than estimated, as customers are assumed to buy either a PC, a bundle of a server and PC or the outside good. This choice was driven both by our understanding of how the market for "workgroup" purchases operates (…rms buy servers not to use them on a stand alone basis but to coordinate and organize PCs). However, we also analyze a more general model that allows the data to determine the degree of complementarity or substitutability between the two products that we call the "free complementarity" model.
Under the free complementarity model a bundle, indicated by (j; k), can include either a server, or a workgroup of PCs, or both. Denote d P C as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any PC is purchased and zero otherwise; similarly we de…ne d S to be the indicator for servers. Each customer i, maximizes utility by choosing at each point in time, t, the bundle of products, (j; k), with the highest utility, where utility is given by:
This is identical to the baseline except we have included an additional term,
it is not a¤ected by a choice of particular brand once (d P C ; d S ) is given and does not vary across customers. This utility structure allows us to model complementarity or substitution at the level of the good, i.e. PC or server, via a "free" parameter, P C;S , that captures the extra utility that a customer obtains from consuming these two products together over and above the utility derived from each product independently. When P C;S is positive we call PCs and servers complements (and if negative substitutes). This model borrows directly from the work of
Gentzkow (2007), who was the …rst to introduce a similar parameter in a discrete setting. Our utility model is more general in that we allow for random coe¢ cients on the model characteristics and prices (Gentzkow does not have price variation in his data). More importantly, our model is designed to be estimated with aggregate market level data. We identify the P C;S parameter in the standard way, by using aggregate time series variation in server prices (in the PC demand equation) and time series variation in PCs prices (in the server demand equation). 38 Further model and estimation details are given in Appendix E.
The "free complementarity" model is presented in the last column of Table 3 where we allow customers to purchase standalone servers (as well as standalone PCs, bundles of PCs and servers or the outside good), and let complementarity to be freely estimated through the parameter P C;S . The estimated P C;S parameter is positive and signi…cant, con…rming our previous assumption and intuition that PCs and servers are complements. The mean and random coe¢ cients all exhibit similar patterns to the baseline results with evidence of signi…cant heterogeneity in price (for servers and PCs) and signi…cant heterogeneity in customers'valuation of PC quality (benchmark) but not server quality (RAM). Figure 4 plots the relative output and margin e¤ects and their con…dence interval. The relative margin is somewhat lower than under the baseline model of column (1) . This is because second degree price discrimination is less powerful because customers who buy servers now come from a group with both low PC demand elasticity and no demand for PCs at all. Nevertheless, we still …nd incentives to degrade interoperability towards the end of the sample period. Relative output e¤ects remain small.
Given that this is a much more demanding speci…cation, the consistency of results with our baseline case is reassuring. 39 So far, to measure the relative output e¤ect we relied heavily on our structural demand model to compute the equilibrium pricing response of each hardware and software producer to a common change of quality in non-Microsoft servers. As a …nal robustness test we also consider an alternative approach to estimating the relative output e¤ect, which considers only the "reduced form" residual demand equations for Microsoft servers and PCs. Since these will be a function of non-Microsoft quality (and other variables), we can use the coe¢ cients on these to calculate the output e¤ects of degradation directly. Appendix F gives the details and shows that relative margins continue to lie far above the relative output e¤ect. The relative output e¤ect is 4 or less, far below the mean relative margin estimated at around 20 in Figure 2 . So even this simpler, less structural approach, suggests strong incentives for Microsoft to reduce interoperability.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the incentives for a monopolist to degrade interoperability in order to monopolize a complementary market. These type of concerns are very common in foreclosure cases such as the European Commission's landmark 2004 Decision against Microsoft. Structural econometric approaches to examining the plausibility of such foreclosure claims have generally been unavailable. This paper seeks to provide such a framework, developing both a new theory and a structural econometric method based upon this theory.
In our model, the incentive to reduce rival quality in a secondary market comes from the desire to more e¤ectively extract rents from the primary market that are limited inter alia by the inability to price discriminate. We detail a general model of heterogeneous demand and derived empirically tractable conditions under which a monopolist would have incentives to degrade interoperability. We then implement our method in the PC and server market, estimating demand parameters with random coe¢ cients and allowing for complementarity. According to our results it seemed that Microsoft had incentives to decrease interoperability at the turn of the 21st century as alleged by competition authorities. In our view, the combination of theory with strong micro-foundations and detailed demand estimation advances our ability to confront complex issues of market abuse.
There are many limitations to what we have done and many areas for improvement. First, our model is static, whereas it is likely that dynamic incentives are also important in foreclosure 
Appendices
A. Proofs A.1. Deriving market shares. To derive the market shares for an individual i we follow BLP and allow random coe¢ cients on the parameter vector i = ( i ; i ; i ) as well as heterogeneity in the size of work groups w i . The latter can be captured by a random coe¢ cient on the server price S i i =w i . We derive demand from the above utility function in the standard way.
First, de…ne the set of realizations of the unobserved variables that lead to the choice of a given system jk across all types of customers as:
Using the population distribution function dP ( ), we can aggregate demands to generate the probability that a buyer of workgroup size w will purchase system jk as:
where s jk is the probability of buying a PC-server bundle jk. The total demand for PCs of type j from users of system jk is then given by q jk = L R ws jk (w)d (w), where (w) is the population distribution of workgroup sizes and L R wd (w) is the maximum number of PCs that could possibly be sold to all buyers of all types. This means that L is the maximal number of potential workgroups (market size). To generate the demand for a PC of type j, we aggregate these demands across all server options to q j = L R ws j (w)d (w), where s j (w) = P K k=0 s jk (w). The demand for server k from users of system jk is analogously given by
The demand for PC operating systems is then given by aggregating over all PC sales: q = L R ws(w)d (w), where s = P J j=1 s j . Let M be the set of server sellers k that run the server operating system sold by the same …rm as the PC operating system. Then the demand for server operating systems for …rm M is given by q M = L R P k2M s k (w)d (w) and the demand for all servers is given by q S = L R P K k=1 s k (w)d (w). We will assume in everything
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that follows that ijk comes from a double exponential distribution, so that conditional on i , s jk ( i ) has the familiar logit form. For PCs this is given by
and for servers this is given by
Own price elasticity for PC operating system
whereas, own price elasticity for monopolist's server operating system is
Cross price elasticity for PC operating system with respect to monopolist's server operating system price
and the cross price elasticity for monopolist's server operating system with respect to PC operating system price is
A.2. Derivation of individual speci…c elasticities.
and
To generate the aggregate elasticities we simply need to add up the frequency-weighted individual elasticities:
We can then determine the sign of ! M and ! by noting that
where the last equality comes from subtracting R h
"dP ( ) = 0 from the second line, where " = R " ! ( i )dP ( ) . For !; the price of PC operating systems we obtain that it is proportional to:
A.3. Proofs of Theoretical Propositions. Proof of Proposition 1: Note …rst that " ! ( ; w) = " ! when there is no heterogeneity. It follows that the expression in (??) is zero and the price cost margin on the server operating system must be zero for any set of PCs and servers o¤ered in the market. But then by (??) the impact of an increase in the quality of a rival server operating system is (! c)
The inequality is strict since there will be some buyers who substitute from buying no workgroup at all to buying a workgroup with the server operating system of the rival when the server operating system quality of the rival is increased. Hence, a quality increase in a rival server operating system can only increase the pro…ts of the PC operating system monopolist. QED.
For proposition 2 we specialize the model to having one brand of PC and one brand of server, each with an operating system provided by the monopolist. We also assume that (beyond di¤erences in ), there is no heterogeneity in the marginal valuation of a server product, i.e. ijk = ij0 for all k.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We …rst show that
is strictly decreasing in and that " ! ( ) is also strictly decreasing. This establishes that in the absence of a rival server product ! M > c M . We then show that if there is a …rm with a higher (but not too high) server quality in the market, the monopolist will always want to foreclose it. First note that:
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that q=w > q M , since all buyers of servers buy w PCs, but there are some buyers of PCs who do not buy servers. The next equality follows by expanding q M ( ) s M ( ) q( ) w and the last inequality follows because ( q( ) w q M ( )) > 0 by the same argument we used for q=w > q M . Now note that
which is decreasing in . It follows that
and " ! ( ) move in the same direction in , which implies by (??) that ! M > c M . Now consider a server rival k entering the market. We only consider equilibria in which …rms set prices no lower than marginal cost. First consider the case ay k < y M . Suppose for contradiction that 0 < ay k w p k < y M w p M . Then the buyer only purchases the server M and locally the o¤ering of rival k does not matter for the price incentives of the monopolist, so that M is at a monopoly optimum. In that case k would have an incentive to set p k below observation with their prices taken from the magazines, and their sales computed by splitting the IDC quantity equally among the observations. Although, clearly, both approaches adopt some ad hoc assumptions, qualitatively the results would probably be similar. Both list and transaction prices experienced a dramatic fall over this period and the increase in the number and variety of PCs o¤ered would have been even more ampli…ed with the latter approach.
For PCs, instead of using the seventeen processor type dummies and the speed of each chip as separate characteristics, we merge them using CPU "benchmarks" for each computer. CPU benchmarks were obtained from The CPU Scorecard (www.cpuscorecard.com). They are essentially numbers assigned to each processor-speed combination based on technical and performance characteristics. Our …nal unit of observation is de…ned as a manufacturer (e.g. Dell), model (e.g. Optiplex), form factor (e.g. desktop), processor type (e.g. Pentium II) and processor speed (e.g. 266 MHZ) combination with additional information on other characteristics such as the RAM, hard disk, modem/Ethernet, CD-ROM and monitor size.
Similarly, for servers, a unit of observation is de…ned as a manufacturer and family/modeltype. We also distinguish by operating system, since (unlike PCs) many servers run nonWindows operating systems. These server operating systems are divided into six non-Windows categories: Netware, Unix, Linux, VMS, OS390/400 and a residual. For servers, key characteristics are also RAM, the number of rack slots 5 , whether the server was rack optimized (racks were an innovation that enhanced server ‡exibility), motherboard type (e.g. Symmetric Parallel Processing -SMP), and chip type (CISC, RISC or IA32). For more discussion of the datasets and characteristics see International Data Corporation (1998, 1999a,b) and Van Reenen (2004 , 2006 .
The PC data allows us to distinguish by end user. Since servers are very rarely purchased by customers and small …rms, we condition on PCs purchased by …rms with over 500 employees. Results were robust to changing this size threshold (see Genakos, 2004 , for separate estimation by customer type).
Given the aggregate nature of our data, we assume that the total market size is given by the total number of employees in large businesses is taken from the Bureau of Labour Statistics. Results based on di¤erent assumptions about the potential market size are also reported in the robustness section.
C. Estimation Algorithm Details
In this section we describe in detail the algorithm followed for the estimation of the baseline model.
De…ne e ( P C ; S ; P C p ; S p ), the vector of non-linear parameters, i.e., the random coe¢ cients on characteristics and price for PCs and servers. Let r be the set of variables that we are allowing non-linear parameters (e.g. x j ; y k ; p j ; p k ). Let = ( j ; k ); = ( P C j ; S k ); i = P C i ; S i and i = ( ij ; ik ): Our iterative procedure is as follows:
Step 0: Draw the idiosyncratic taste terms i (these draws remain constant throughout the estimation procedure) and starting values for e .
Step 1. Given (r; e ), calculate i .
Step 2. Given ( ; i ), calculate individual customer product market shares for PCs and servers and aggregate to get market shares for each brand. We use a smooth simulator by integrating the logit errors analytically.
Step 3. Given e , we need to numerically compute the mean valuations, , that equate the observed to the predicted brand market shares. Due to complementarity between the PCs and servers, we compute each product category's mean valuation conditional on the other category's mean valuation. Speci…cally, it consists of the following sequentially iterative substeps: Substep 3.0 Make an initial guess on and set old = : Substep 3.1 Compute j given k using BLP's contraction mapping. Update . Substep 3.2 Compute k given j using BLP's contraction mapping and update . Step 4. Given , calculate and form the GMM.
Step 5. Minimize a quadratic form of the residuals and update. We also estimated two other variants of this algorithm. The …rst one reiterates one additional time substeps 3.1 and 3.2 to make sure that there is no feedback from PCs to server mean valuations. This variant takes slightly more computational time and its impact was negligible in the results. The second variant instead of updating the mean valuations for each product category in substeps 3.1 and 3.2, always uses the initial estimates (taken from the simple logit IV regression). This variant takes more computational time, but it is more robust to starting values and is the one that we mainly used.
D. Calculating the relative output effect, the relative margin effect and standard errors There is an incentive to decrease interoperability at the margin if:
where the left hand side is the relative margin, whereas the right hand side is the relative output e¤ect.
In our baseline speci…cation, individual PC and server market shares are given by:
To get the aggregate PC and server market shares s j = 1 ns P ns i=1 s ij and s k = 1 ns P ns i=1 s ik , where ns is the number of drawn individuals. Finally, remember that p j =p j + ! and for servers p k =p k + ! k .
In order to calculate the relative output e¤ect, note that this derivative contains the direct e¤ect of interoperability on demand as well as the impact of the price responses to a change in interoperability by all rival software producers and all hardware producers. In other words, the nominator of the relative output e¤ect is given by:
where the …rst term inside the parenthesis is the direct e¤ect, the second term is the indirect PC hardware e¤ect, the third term is the indirect server hardware e¤ect, and the last one is the indirect server non-Microsoft software e¤ect.
Similarly the denominator of the relative output e¤ect is given by:
Each term inside the parenthesis in (20) is given below:
Finally, we calculate the derivatives of prices w.r.t. a numerically using the pricing function of the supply side for hardware (PC and server) and non-Microsoft software producers assuming a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium.
Speci…cally, assume that each of the F multiproduct PC hardware …rms has a portfolio, f , of the j = 1; :::; J di¤erent products in the PC market. Then the pro…t function of …rm f can be expressed as
where s j (p) is the predicted market share of brand j, which depends on the prices of all other brands, M is the market size and mc j is the constant marginal cost of production. Assuming that there exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices, and that all prices that support it are strictly positive, then the price p j of any product produced by …rm f must satisfy the …rst-order condition
This system of J equations can be inverted to solve for the marginal costs. De…ne,
@s j (p)=@p r , if j and r are produced by the same …rm (j; r = 1; :::; J), 0, otherwise, then we can write the above FOC in vector notation as:
Given our demand estimates, we calculate the estimated markup. We then compute numerically the derivatives @p j / @a using "Richardson's extrapolation". We follow the same methodology to calculate the derivatives @p k / @a and @! k / @a.
To calculate the relative margin
where the derivatives for the PCs are:
own price semi-elasticity :
cross PC price semi-elasticity :
cross PC-server semi-elasticity :
Similarly, the derivatives for the servers are: own price semi-elasticity :
To compute the gradient of the objective function, we need the derivatives of the mean value = ( j ; k ) with respect to the non-linear parameters e ( ; S ; p ; S p ):
:::
::: :::
where e i , i = 1; :::; H denotes the i's element of the vector e , which contains the non-linear parameters of the model. Given the smooth simulator used for the market shares, the above derivatives are as follows. The derivatives for the PCs w.r.t the mean valuations are:
The derivatives for the servers w.r.t the mean valuations are:
The derivatives for the PCs w.r.t the non-linear parameters are:
The derivatives for the servers w.r.t the non-linear parameters are:
We also calculated the standard errors based on this Jacobian.
E. Estimation details of free complementarity model
Under the "free complementarity" model a bundle, indicated by (j; k), can include either a server, or a workgroup of PCs, or both. Denote d P C as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any PC is purchased and zero otherwise; similarly we de…ne d S to be the indicator for servers. Each customer i, maximizes utility by choosing at each point in time, t, the bundle of products, (j; k), with the highest utility, where utility is given by:
This is identical to the baseline except we have included an additional term, (d P C ; d S ), that it is not a¤ected by a choice of particular brand once (d P C ; d S ) is given and does not vary across customers. This utility structure allows us to model complementarity or substitution at the level of the good, i.e. PC or server, via a "free" parameter, P C;S , that captures the extra utility that a customer obtains from consuming these two products together over and above the utility derived from each product independently. When P C;S is positive we call PCs and servers complements (and if negative substitutes). Since utilities are de…ned over bundles of models across categories, the model cannot be directly taken to aggregate data. We need to derive marginal probabilities of purchase in each category and the conditional (on purchase) models choice probabilities. To derive these probabilities, we need to assume that the error term, ijkt , is logit i.i.d. distributed across bundles, customers and time. Given this assumption on the error term, for each customer de…ne W ij P J j=1 exp( j + ij ), the inclusive value for PCs, and W iS P K k=1 exp( k + ik ), the inclusive value for servers. Then, using the result derived in Song and Chintagunta (2006) , the marginal probability for purchasing a PC is given by:
Pr(d P C = 1j x j ; y k ; i) = W ij W ik e P C;S + W ij W ij W ik e P C;S + W ij + W ik + 1
This follows because Pr( d P C = 1j x; i) = W P C (e (d P C ;d S ) W S + e (d P C ;0) ) W P C (e (d P C ;d S ) W S + e (d P C ;0) ) + (e (0;d S ) W S + e (0;0) ) and we normalize g P C = g S = 0.
The conditional brand choice probability for PC j is given by:
The unconditional brand choice probability is obtained by multiplication:
Pr( j = 1j x j ; y k ; i) = Pr( d P C = 1j x j ; y k ; i) Pr( jj d P C = 1; x j ; y k ; i).
Market shares for each product, s j (and s k ), are obtained by aggregating over customers and their vectors of unobservable tastes.
The estimation of this model follows a similar logic to the one estimated in the main text. The only major di¤erence now is that we have an additional non-linear parameter apart from the random coe¢ cients. De…ne 2 ( P C ; S ; P C p ; S p ) then e ( 2 ; P C;S ) is now the vector of non-linear parameters, i.e. the random coe¢ cients on characteristics and price for PCs and servers and the complementarity parameter. Let r be the set of variables that we are allowing non-linear parameters (e.g. x j ; y k ; p j ; p k ). Let = ( j ; k ); = ( Our iterative procedure is as follows:
Step 1. Given (r; 2 ), calculate i .
Step 2. Given ( ; i ), calculate the conditional probabilities of equation (24) for PCs and servers.
Step 3. Given ( ; i ; P C;S ) calculate the marginal probabilities of equation (23) for PCs and servers.
Step 4. Calculate the unconditional brand probabilities of equation (25) and aggregate to get the market shares for each brand.
Step 5. Given e , we need to numerically compute the mean valuations, , that equate the observed to the predicted brand market shares. Due to complementarity between the PCs and servers, we compute each product category's mean valuation conditional on the other category's mean valuation. Speci…cally, it consists of the following sequentially iterative substeps: Step 6. Given , calculate and form the GMM.
Step 7. Minimize a quadratic form of the residuals and update. We also estimated two other variants of this algorithm. The …rst one reiterates one additional time substeps 5.1 and 5.2 to make sure that there is no feedback from PCs to server mean valuations. This variant takes slightly more computational time. The second variant, instead of updating the mean valuations for each product category in substeps 5.1 and 5.2, always uses the initial estimates (taken from the simple logit IV regression). This variant takes more computational time, but it is more robust to starting values. To minimize the GMM function we used both the Nelder-Mead nonderivative search method, and the faster Quasi-Newton gradient method based on an analytic gradient. We combine all these methods to verify that we reached a global instead of a local minimum. Standard errors are based on the same analytic Jacobian, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity taking also into consideration the additional variance introduced by the simulation.
F. Estimating the relative output effect through a residual demand approach
As an alternative way to estimate the relative output e¤ect, , we resort to a method that makes as little assumptions as possible about the maximization behavior of rivals to Microsoft in the server market. In essence, we estimate the residual demand functions for Microsoft's PC operating system demand q and server operating system demand q M . This means that we are looking at the demands when all other players in the market are setting their equilibrium prices. This residual demand function will depend on the characteristics of PCs that are sold, as well as the PC operating system, the characteristics of Microsoft and non-Microsoft servers. We consider a "reduced form" estimation of PC and server quantities, as well as on the operating system prices of Microsoft ! and ! M . Note that the derivatives of residual demand with respect to interoperability a corresponds precisely to the derivatives we need to calculate the relative output e¤ect. One worry is that changes in interoperability are fairly infrequent and hard to observe. However, given the assumption that server characteristics enter the indirect utility function linearly, the ratio of the derivatives is the same for any common marginal change in a given quality characteristics of rival servers. We can therefore exploit the quality variation in rival servers to identify the relative output e¤ect. A further complication is that the number of observations to identify the relevant parameters is much lower than for our demand estimation, because we cannot exploit any cross-sectional variation in our data. For that reason we construct quality indices (following Nevo, 2003) for rival servers, Microsoft servers, and PCs in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. We thus obtain estimating equations: rising (in absolute value) for servers and falling closer to zero for PCs. This suggests that a degradation strategy would have low cost for Microsoft in terms of lost PC sales. The relative output e¤ect is only 0.28 for the IV speci…cation.
We include a host of other controls in the last two columns -Microsoft's own server quality, operating system quality, PC operating system prices and Microsoft's server operating system price. The coe¢ cients remain correctly signed and the implied relative output e¤ect remains below 4. Unsurprisingly, given the low degrees of freedom in the time series, the standard errors are large.
Overall, the "reduced form" results in Table A5 are consistent with the more structural approach taken in the body of the paper. On average the relative output e¤ect is small and certainly much smaller than the increase in margins from reducing interoperability.
